旅游景区环境保护博弈分析(英文)

编号 zgly0001409938

文献类型 期刊论文

文献题名 旅游景区环境保护博弈分析(英文)

作者 宋健峰  吴艳 

作者单位 西北农林科技大学经济管理学院  河海大学商学院 

母体文献 Journal of Landscape Research 

年卷期 2011年10期

年份 2011 

分类号 X37  F592  F224.32 

关键词 Tourism  Environmental Protection  One-time Game  Repeated Game 

文摘内容 Game model of environmental protection at scenic spots is established in this paper in order to carry out analysis of the equilibrium between one-time game and infinitely repeated game, disclose the reasons why the environment of scenic spots are destroyed, and propose the countermeasures to ensure the equilibrium of the game. The study also reveals that during the one-time game between tourists and tour operators, it is tour operators’ dominant strategy not to control environmental pollution that leads to the destruction of environment at scenic spots. While, during the infinitely repeated game between tourists and tour operators, the realization of Pareto optimality equilibrium (The strategy of tourist is traveling, and the strategy of tour operators are controlling environmental pollution) is dependent upon the choice of players (tourists or operators) of triggering strategy (traveling or controlling environmental pollution). The supervision of the government upon operators can force them to control environmental pollution, which can consequently improve the efficiency of equilibrium in the game, and promote environmental protection at tourism scenic spots and sustainable development of tourism.